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Understanding	Standing:	Permission	
to	Deflect	Reasons	
Ori	J	Herstein∗	
Forthcoming	in	PHILOSOPHICAL	STUDIES	(2017)∗	
1.	Introduction		Given	 that	 his	 own	 army	 has	 been	 suspected	 of	 using	chemical	 weapons	 (Steinvorth	 2010),	 there	 is	 something	problematic	 in	 the	 autocratic	 President	 of	 Turkey,	 Recep	Erdogan,	 condemning	 Syrian	 dictator,	 Bashar	 Assad,	 for	using	 chemical	 weapons	 and	 demanding	 that	 he	 stop.		Although	 right,	 Erdogan	 lacks	 standing	 to	 do	 so.		Accordingly,	 while	 Assad	 obviously	 has	 numerous	overwhelming	 reasons	 to	 cease	his	heinous	 acts,	 Erdogan’s	hypocritical	 demands	 and	 condemnations,	which	 appear	 to	be	 among	 those	 reasons,	 are	 somehow	 discountable.1		 But	how	or	in	what	sense	are	they	discountable?				Standing	norms	regulate	when	one	 is	at	 liberty	 to	 interfere	in	the	affairs	of	another	–	be	it	through	action	or	the	giving	of	reasons	 –	 and	 how	 those	 interfered	 with	 may	 react	 to	 an	intervention	 performed	 without	 standing.	 	 Namely,	 the	addressee	or	target	of	such	an	intervention	may	deflect	it.		A																																																														
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pointing	 out	 to	 him	 –	 that	 Assad’s	 actions	 are	 heinous.	 	 All	 that	Assad	 may	 ignore	 is	 Erdogan’s	 demands	 and	 condemnations	 as	reasons	in	and	of	themselves.						
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key	 feature	 of	 standing	 norms	 is	 that	 having	 standing	 to	intervene	 turns	on	ad	hominem	 facts	 about	 the	 intervening	party	and	not	on	the	independent	validity	or	rightness	of	her	intervention.			The	 types	 of	 ad	 hominem	 conditions	 determinative	 of	standing	to	 interfere	are,	of	course,	many	and	diverse.	 	The	paper	 focuses	 on	 three	 general	 and	 very	 different	 types	 of	practices	 of	 standing,	 grouped	 under	 the	 headings	 of	 tu	
quoque,	age	tuum	negotium	and	 ‘know	thy	place’.	 	 Instances	of	these	practices	involve:	X	(e.g.,	Erdogan)	seemingly	giving	
Y	(e.g.,	Assad)	reasons	to	Ф	(e.g.,	condemnation	and	demand	as	 reasons	 to	 cease	 targeting	 civilians)	 yet	 –	 because	 of	certain	facts	about	X	(e.g.,	Erdogan’s	hypocrisy)	–	the	practice	is	 that	Y	 may	 appropriately	 deflect	 those	 reasons.	 	What	 is	typically	deflected	in	such	practices	are	interventions	in	the	form	 of	 directives,	 which	 are	 speech	 acts	 that	 constitute	what	 I	 call	 ‘directive-reasons’,	 that	 is	 reasons	 to	 do	 as	 one	directs	because	one	directed	it.			The	 question	 is:	 what	 is	 the	 normative	 structure	 of	 this	
putatively	 appropriate	 deflection	 of	 reasons	 typical	 of	practices	 such	 as	 tu	quoque,	age	 tuum	negotium	 and	 ‘know	thy	place’?		The	qualifier	‘putatively’	is	used	to	signal	that	the	focus	is	on	the	normative	structure	of	practices,	rather	than	on	arguing	for	the	moral	appropriateness	of	these	practices	(for	 stylistic	 reasons	 I	 will	 avoid	 repeating	 the	 term	‘putatively’).	 	 By	 ‘deflection’	 I	 mean:	 to	 reject	 out	 of	 hand,	ignore,	 brush	 off	 or	 discount	 without	 substantive	deliberation	on	the	merits	of	the	deflected	intervention.		The	term	 ‘appropriate’	 or	 alternatively	 ‘okay’	 is	 used	 with	 the	purpose	of	describing	the	legitimacy	of	the	deflection,	which	is	assumed	in	practices	of	standing,	without	committing	to	a	specific	picture	of	the	normative	structure	of	these	practices:	Is	the	deflection	required?		Justified?		Permitted?			At	 the	end,	 the	paper	argues	that	practices	of	standing	best	fit	what	 I	 call	 the	 ‘exclusion	model’,	 according	 to	which	 the	putatively	appropriate	deflection	typical	to	practices	such	as	
tu	quoque,	age	tuum	negotium	and	‘know	thy	place’	takes	the	form	of	 a	permission	 to	disregard	 certain	 types	of	 reasons.		Other	models	the	paper	explores	and	then	reject	are	what	I	call	the	‘alteration	model’	(e.g.,	given	Erdogan’s	hypocrisy	his	intervention	 invites	 yet	 does	 not	 require	 attention),	 the	‘invalidation	 model’	 (e.g.,	 given	 Erdogan’s	 hypocrisy	 his	intervention	is	normatively	weightless),	and	the	‘competition	
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model’	 (e.g.,	 Erdogan’s	 hypocrisy	 is	 reason	 for	 rejecting	 his	intervention).			Beyond	 gaining	understanding	 into	 the	nature	 of	 the	much	neglected	 normative	 category	 of	 ‘standing’	 and	 more	specifically	 into	 these	 pervasive	 social	 practices,	 the	implication	of	vindicating	the	‘exclusion	model’	(or	even	the	‘alteration	model’)	and	of	rejecting	 the	 ‘invalidation	model’,	which	 is	 the	model	 implicit	 in	much	of	 the	 literature,	 is	 the	disaggregation	 of	 norms	 of	 standing	 from	 norms	 of	validation	 with	 which	 they	 are	 often	mistakenly	 conflated,	mainly	norms	of	(normative)	power	and	authority.		Thereby	establishing	 ‘standing’	 as	 a	 significant	 and	 independent	normative	concept	and	revealing	a	conceptual	space	for	valid	yet	deflectable	directives	(for	example	cases	involving	states	holding	 valid	 authority	 to	 direct	 their	 citizens,	 yet	 still	lacking	 the	 standing	 to	 so	 direct).	 	 The	 implications	 for	moral,	political	and	legal	philosophy	are	many.												The	question	of	whether	or	not	practices	of	standing	–	such	as	tu	quoque,	age	tuum	negotium	and	 ‘know	thy	place’	–	are	justified	is	left	to	another	occasion.		Before	we	hold	them	up	to	 assessment	 we	 first	 need	 a	 fuller	 and	 more	 nuanced	understanding	of	the	structure	of	these	common	practices.			
2.	The	Phenomena	2.1	Practices	of	Deflection	
Tu	quoque	(‘you	too’	or,	more	loosely,	 ‘who	are	you	to	say’),	
age	tuum	negotium	(loosely,	 ‘mind	your	own	business’),	and	‘know	 thy	 place’	 (hereinafter	 collectively	 referred	 to	 as	‘TAK’)	 are	 general	 categories	 allowing	 for	 many	 variations	and	appearing	 in	 countless	 everyday	practices.	 	While	very	different	from	each	other,	all	involve	people	behaving	as	if	it	were	appropriate	 to	deflect	as	well	as	block	and/or	criticize	what	 otherwise	 seem	 like	 valid	 and	 rightful	 interventions.		Moreover,	 all	 these	 practices	 typically	 exhibit	 qualities	 of	standing	 norms,	 as	 the	 grounds	 for	 the	 appropriateness	 of	the	 deflection,	 blocking	 and/or	 criticism	 have	 to	 do	 more	with	 facts	 about	 the	 intervening	 party	 than	 with	 an	evaluation	 of	 the	 independent	 rightness	 or	 validity	 of	 her	intervention.		Circumstances	 of	 age	 tuum	 negotium	 involve	 appropriate	deflecting,	 blocking	 and/or	 criticizing	 interventions	 on	 the	
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basis	of	the	intervening	party	being	an	outsider	to	or	lacking	a	stake	in	the	underlying	transaction,	relationship,	context	or	circumstances	 in	 which	 her	 intervention	 is	 situated.	 	 For	example,	 even	 if	 the	 U.K.	 government	 should	 abolish	 its	monarchy,	France	campaigning,	urging,	asking	or	demanding	of	 the	 U.K.	 government	 to	 do	 so	 seems	 out	 of	 place.	 	 It	 is	simply	 not	 France’s	 business,	 which	 is	 why	 it	 seems	appropriate	 for	 the	 U.K.	 government	 to	 deflect	 and	 simply	ignore	France’s	demands	 in	 its	deliberations	on	 the	matter.		The	 same	 would	 presumably	 not	 be	 true	 for	 similar	interventions	by	the	Scottish	Parliament,	which	does	hold	a	stake	in	the	debate	over	the	future	of	the	British	monarchy.2			Cases	of	tu	quoque	involve	moral	inconsistency	or	hypocrisy.		‘Tu	 quoque’	 refers	 here	 to	 a	 family	 of	 practices	 involving	appropriate	deflections	of	hypocritical	interventions.		Types	of	examples	include	but	are	not	limited	to	cases	involving:	a	person	guilty	of	past	wrongdoing	similar	to	the	wrongdoing	of	 others	 with	 whom	 he	 now	 critically	 interferes	 (like	 the	Erdogan	 example);	 a	 claimant	 or	 accuser	 who	 previously	wronged	the	party	he	is	now	criticizing,	urging,	accusing	or	making	a	claim	against;	a	claimant	or	accuser	who	has	acted	or	 is	 acting	 wrongfully	 in	 the	 same	 factual	 context	 or	transaction	 for	or	 in	which	 she	 is	now	critically	 interfering	with	others;	and	cases	 involving	double	standards,	wherein	one	 is	 blocked	 from	 furthering	 or	 applying	 a	 standard	 or	position	 that	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 standard	 or	 position	one	holds	in	relation	to	or	has	applied	to	similar	cases.3			For	 example,	 even	 assuming	 that	 emperors	 of	 Rome	 must	consider	 the	 prescriptions	 of	 imperial	 advisers	 and	Roman	noblemen,	 Caligula’s	 bloodstained	 record	 as	 an	 emperor	seems	 to	 disqualify	 him	 from	 directing	 others	 on	 how	 to	govern,	 which	 is	 why	 it	 would	 presumably	 be	 appropriate	for	 likewise	 deficient	 emperors,	 such	 as	 Nero,	 to	 dismiss	Caligula’s	 valid	 requests	 and	 demands	 for	 improvement.		Accordingly,	it	is	okay	for	Nero	to	respond	to	an	intervention	of	his	uncle	Caligula	with	“Who	are	you	to	criticize	anyone?!”	and	 then	 simply	 ignore	 him.	 	Moreover,	 prior	 to	 or	 during	Caligula’s	 intervention	 it	would	 be	 appropriate	 for	Nero	 to																																																														
2	Briefly	 on	 everyday	 instances	 of	 age	 tuum	 negotium	 see	 Duff	(2010);	Smith	(2007);	Wertheimer	(1998).	3 	For	 examples	 of	 tu	 quoque	 see	 Cohen	 (2006);	 Duff	 (2010);	Friedman	(2013)	and	Todd	(2012).	
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stop	Caligula	 in	his	 tracks	by	saying,	 for	 instance,	 “Shut	up!		
You	 of	 all	 people	 have	 no	 right	 to	 go	 there.”	 	 It	 is	 okay	 for	Nero	to	deflect	and	block	Caligula’s	 intervention	because	of	Caligula’s	 hypocrisy,	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 as	 a	nobleman	 of	 Rome	 Caligula’s	 requests	 and	 demands	 carry	weight.	 	Notice	that	had	exactly	the	same	 intervention	come	from	 a	more	 competent	 ruler	 or	 a	 nobler	 person,	 let’s	 say	from	 Nero’s	 adopted	 father	 Claudius	 or	 from	 his	 tutor	Seneca,	 Nero	would	 not	 have	 been	 permitted	 to	 dismiss	 it	without	first	deliberating	on	its	merits.				A	 third	 category	 of	 cases	 involves	 circumstances	 I	 label	‘know	thy	place’.	 	Here	the	appropriateness	of	deflecting	an	intervention	 turns	 on	 the	 intervening	 party	 lacking	 in	 a	certain	 status	 or	 position	 required	 to	 intervene.	 	 For	instance,	 certain	 criticisms	 are	 only	 permissibly	 delivered	among	members	of	the	same	ethnic,	racial	or	national	group	or	among	friends	or	family	members,	not	by	outsiders.		This	is	not	because	one’s	compatriots	or	friends	have	a	personal	stake	in	the	matter,	but	rather	is	a	feature	of	their	relation	to	the	 subject	 of	 the	 intervention.	 	 Personal	 achievements,	excellence	or	virtue	can	also	ground	the	status	required	for	intervention.	 	This	 is	possibly	what	people	sometimes	have	in	mind	when	 speaking	 of	 ‘moral	 authority’.	 	 For	 example,	there	 are	 certain	 interventions	 into	our	 affairs	 that	we	 feel	we	 must	 entertain	 when	 delivered	 by	 mentors,	 elders	 or	heroes	that	we	would	reject	offhand	without	any	substantive	deliberation	if	delivered	by	anyone	else.	As	indicated,	practices	of	TAK	share	some	common	features.		One	 party	 sets	 out	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 affairs	 of	 another,	where	 the	 intervention	 may	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	 physical	interference	 or	 of	 a	 –	 among	 other	 speech	 acts	 –	 claim,	demand,	 accusation,	 condemnation,	 request,	 question,	insistence	or	urging.	 	Yet,	because	of	certain	facts	about	the	intervening	party	–	 that	she	 is,	broadly	speaking,	meddling,	intervening	hypocritically	or	lacking	the	requisite	status	–	it	is	 appropriate	 for	 the	 party	 who	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 the	intervention	 to	deflect	 the	 intervention.	 	Moreover,	 in	 such	cases	 deflecting	 an	 intervention	 is	 considered	 appropriate	even	 if,	 were	 we	 to	 disregard	 any	 issues	 of	 TAK,	 such	deflection	would	be	considered	inappropriate.		The	question	is:	 what	 is	 the	 normative	 structure	 of	 this	 ‘appropriate	
deflection’	of	 interventions	predicated	on	the	aforementioned	
facts	about	intervening	parties?	
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A	 further	 feature	 typical	 to	 all	 three	 categories	 is	 that	intervening	under	 conditions	 of	meddling,	 lack	 of	 status	 or	hypocrisy	 involves	 some	 sort	 of	 wronging	 against	 the	intervention's	 target.	 	We	 can	detect	 this	wrongness	 in	 the	critical	 reactions	 of	 addressees	 to	 those	 who,	 for	 example,	direct	them	hypocritically	or	officiously.		For	instance,	“who	the	hell	are	you	to	demand	that	of	me!”;	“you	stay	out	of	it!”;	or	“mind	your	own	business!”	are	responses	we	tend	to	bark	rather	than	say.		And	we	view	such	reactions	as	appropriate,	even	 though	 they	 involve	 negative,	 aggressive	 and	 even	hurtful	emotions	and	behavior,	such	as	annoyance,	criticism,	indignation	 and	 anger.	 	 Most	 importantly,	 we	 ground	 the	justification	for	such	reactions	in	the	intervener's	meddling,	hypocrisy	 or	 lack	 of	 status.	 	 Further	 indication	 of	 the	wrongness	 of	 intervening	 under	 the	 aforementioned	conditions	 is	 that	often	our	 reason	 for	 avoiding	doing	 so	 is	our	sense	that	it	would	be	wrongful	and	would	expose	us	to	legitimate	 criticism	 and	 even	 aggression.	 	 Finally,	 when	intervening	 under	 conditions	 of	 tu	 quoque,	 age	 tuum	
negotium	or	‘know	thy	place’	we	tend	to	ask	for	permission,	implicitly	 and	 even	 explicitly	 apologize	 and	 often	 even	directly	 admit	 our	 wrongdoing.	 	 We	 say	 things	 such	 as	 ‘I	know	 it’s	 none	 of	 my	 business,	 but…’;	 ‘I	 apologize	 for	speaking	 out	 of	 place,	 yet…’;	 or	 ‘I	 will	 understand	 if	 you	completely	 ignore	 what	 I	 have	 to	 say,	 however…’.	 	 These	qualifications	 appear	 designed	 to	 preempt	 criticism	 and	 to	mitigate	 or	 at	 least	 acknowledge	 the	 wrongness	 of	 the	intervention.	 	Accordingly,	 to	 intervene	under	conditions	of	
TAK	seems	intrusive,	disrespectful	and	generally	wrongful	to	the	party	being	interfered	with.			
TAK	 are	 therefore	 complex	 practices.	 	 First,	 they	 delineate	conditions	 for	when	 intervening	with	 others	 is	 permissible	and	when	one	ought	not	to	intervene.		Relatedly,	intervening	where	one	shouldn't	wrongs	the	subject	of	the	intervention.		Second,	practices	of	TAK	determine	conditions	under	which	deflecting	or	blocking	an	intervention	is	appropriate.		Here	I	will	focus	on	explaining	the	normative	nature	and	structure	of	this	‘appropriate	deflection’.				Of	 TAK,	 it	 is	 instances	 of	 tu	 quoque	 –	 specifically	 cases	 of	hypocritical	blaming	or	condemning	–	that	has	attracted	the	most	attention.		This	literature	has	primarily	highlighted	and	focused	 on	 explaining	 the	 apparent	 wrongness	 of	 this	specific	 type	 of	 hypocrisy	 (Duff	 2010;	 Friedman	 2013;	Wallace	 2010;	 Smith	 2007;	 Tadros	 2009).	 	 In	 contrast,	
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although	arguably	the	most	practically	significant	feature	of	practices	of	TAK,	 the	 literature	has	 surprisingly	 focused	 far	less	 on	 exploring	 the	 deflecting	 feature	 of	 these	 practices	and	practically	not	at	all	on	how	practices	of	TAK	involve	the	deflection	 of	 reasons	 and	 undermine	 the	 giving	 of	 reasons,	arguably	 the	 most	 salient	 feature	 of	 TAK	 practices	 and	 of	standing	norms	more	generally.				2.2	What	Is	Deflected?	–	Directive-Reasons	
2.2.1	Focusing	on	the	Giving	of	Reasons		I	 said	 that	 TAK	 practices	 involve	 the	 deflection	 of	'interventions',	 which	 of	 course	 come	 in	 many	 forms,	including	 physical	 interventions	 as	 well	 as	 the	 giving	 of	reasons,	including	reasons	for	actions,	beliefs	and	emotions.4		Consider	 the	 following	 example	 involving	 appropriate	deflections	 of	 different	 types	 of	 reasons.	 	 A	 young	 boy	 is	annoyingly	picking	on	another	 child	playing	 in	 the	park.	 	A	stranger	 troubled	 by	 this	 scene	 does	 one	 of	 the	 following:	firmly	picks	up	the	boy	and	sets	him	down	a	few	feet	away;	shames	 the	 boy;	 gives	 the	 boy	 a	 sermon	 explaining	 about	differentiating	 right	 from	wrong;	 or	 commands	 the	 boy	 to	stop.			Arguably	 under	 such	 circumstances	 it	 would	 have	 been	appropriate	for	the	young	boy	to	say	“You’re	not	my	father”	and	 to	 ignore	 the	 man’s	 intervention,	 and	 for	 the	 boy’s	parents	to	say,	“Even	if	he	was	misbehaving,	you	had	no	right	to	 do	 (or	 say)	 that!	 	 That	 is	 our	 job.”	 	 Notice	 that	 the	incredulous	 boy	 and	 his	 angered	 parents	 are	 not	 claiming	that	 the	 boy	 should	 not	 have	 been	 removed,	 shamed,	educated	 or	 ordered	 to	 stop.	 	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	 agree	that	 those	 were	 appropriate	 interventions	 in	 response	 to	their	boy’s	conduct.		Rather,	the	boy’s	and	the	parents’	point	is	that	only	the	parents	are	of	the	requisite	status	to	do	so.			Thus,	although	meritorious,	 the	stranger’s	 intervention	was	an	intrusion	into	the	parents’	and	child’s	protected	domains.		So	 that	 even	 if	 the	 stranger	 acted	 rightly,	 or	 even	 if	 his	shaming	 (giving	of	 a	 reason	 for	emotion)	was	 fitting,	or	his	sermon	 (giving	of	 a	 reason	 for	belief)	 true	or	his	 command	(giving	of	a	reason	for	action)	valid,	it	was	not	his	place	to	do																																																														
4	On	types	of	reason	see	Parfit	(2001,	p.	18);	Scanlon	(1988,	p.	17).		
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so,	 and	 accordingly	 his	 intervention	 was	 vulnerable	 to	deflection	and	criticism.			In	what	 follows	 I	 focus	 on	 understanding	 practices	 of	TAK	through	 exploring	 cases	 involving	 the	 deflection	 of	interventions	 that	 give	 reasons	 for	 actions	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	degree,	 emotions,	 that	 is	 on	 the	 deflection	 of	 what	 I	 call	‘directives’.	 	 The	 deflection	 of	 reasons	 for	 belief	 is	 left	unexplored,	although	I	believe	the	following	analysis	applies,	
mutatis	mutandis,	in	the	epistemic	case	as	well.		
2.2.2	Directives				Following	 (and	 expanding	 on)	 J.R.	 Searle	 and	 D.	Vanderveken’s	 terminology,	 I	 take	 the	 term	 ‘directive’	 to	stand	 for	 a	 broad	 spectrum	of	 speech	 acts.	 	 Among	 others,	urging,	 permitting,	 asking,	 suggesting,	 prohibiting,	requesting,	 requiring,	demanding,	advocating,	commanding,	ordering,	insisting,	blaming,	condemning	and	claiming	are	all	speech	 acts	 that	 may	 incorporate	 a	 directive	 (Searle	 and	Vanderveken	1985,	pp.	55-56).	Directives	govern	and	guide	or	are	at	least	intended	to	do	so.		Directives,	therefore,	hold	themselves	 out	 as	 normative,	 because	 in	 directing	 we	purport	 to	 trigger,	 generate	 or	 give	 reasons.	 	 Notice	 that	directives	 are	 not	 pieces	 of	 advice.	 	 They	 do	 not	 point	 out	reasons	 but	 rather	 they	 are	 reasons	 for	 actions	 and	emotions.	 	 Note	 also	 that	 ‘directives’	 include	 imperatives	(e.g.,	orders,	 commands)	but	are	not	 limited	 to	 imperatives	(e.g.,	requests,	urgings).		Finally,	a	terminological	point:	The	action	a	directive	purports	to	be	a	reason	for	is	a	‘directive-action’	and	the	agent	to	whom	a	directive	is	issued,	that	is	a	directive’s	addressee,	is	a	‘directive-subject’.										Cases	 of	 TAK	 often	 involve	 the	 deflection	 of	 interventions	that	take	the	form	of	directives.		For	instance,	when	Caligula	blames	Nero	for	being	a	bad	emperor	he	not	only	expresses	his	 negative	 reactive	 emotions	 to	 Nero’s	 conduct	 but	 also	aims	to	actively	give	Nero	reason	to	change	his	ways	(i.e.,	a	reason	 to	 act)	 as	 well	 as	 a	 reason	 to	 feel	 remorse,	 shame,	responsibility	 and	 purpose	 (to	 improve),	 which	 are	 fitting	emotional	 reactions	 to	 blaming.	 	 Yet,	 given	 Caligula’s	hypocrisy,	 it	would	be	appropriate	 for	Nero	 to	deflect	both	interventions.			
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2.2.3	Directives	and	Directive-Reasons		Given	 that	 directives	 are	 speech	 acts	 that	 purport	 to	 be	reasons	 for	 their	 directive-subjects,	 the	 next	 stage	 is	 to	clarify	what	sort	of	reason	they	are.		A	(valid)	directive	is	the	reason	 that	 it	 purports	 to	 be:	 a	 reason	 for	 the	 directive-subject	 to	 perform	 the	 directive-action	 because	 of	 the	
directive.		Let’s	call	such	reasons	‘directive-reasons’,	so	that	a	directive	to	Ф	is	a	reason-to-Ф-because-of-the-directive’.		For	example,	 in	 asking	 you	 to	Ф	 I	 intend	 for	 the	 request	 –	my	
asking	 you	 –	 to	 be	 a	 reason	 for	 you	 to	 Ф.	 	 Similarly,	 in	ordering	 you	 to	Ф	 I	 intend	 for	my	order	 to	 be	 a	 reason	 for	you	to	Ф.	Accordingly,	 directive-reasons	 are	 not	 only	 reasons	 for	conformity	 but	 also	 reasons	 for	 compliance.	 	 To	 conform	with	a	reason	for	action	is	to	perform	that	action	under	the	conditions	 in	which	 that	 reason	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 performing	that	action.		To	comply	with	a	reason	for	action	is	to	perform	the	 action	 not	 only	 in	 conformity	with	 the	 reason	 but	 also	(also)	 out	 of	 awareness	 of	 and	 because	 of	 the	 reason	 (Raz	1990,	 pp.	 178-179).	 	 	 In	 other	 words,	 to	 conform	 with	 a	reason	to	Ф	one	must	Ф.	 	Yet	 to	comply	with	a	reason	to	Ф	one	must	Ф	(also)	because	of	that	reason.		So	that	if	one	Фs,	and	 thereby	conforms	with	a	directive	 to	Ф,	 yet	 in	 so	doing	one	does	not	also	comply	with	the	directive	–	i.e.,	does	not	Ф	(also)	 because	 of	 the	 directive	 –	 then	 one	 does	 not	 fully	satisfy	the	directive-reason.	 	For	example,	 if	I	ask	my	friend	to	Ф	then	 I	 do	not	only	 intend	 for	my	 friend	 to	Ф,	 but	 also	that	 he	 Ф	 because	 I	 asked	 him	 to	 Ф.	 	 If	 my	 friend	 Фs	regardless	of	my	request	but	for	some	other	reason	entirely,	then	he	does	not	 fully	satisfy	my	directive,	even	 though	his	actions	 conformed	 to	 my	 directive.	 	 Mere	Ф–ing	 does	 not	fully	 satisfy	 my	 request	 because	 the	 request	 was	 not	 only	that	my	friend	Ф	but	also	that	he	Ф	because	I	asked	him	to.		It	is	therefore	no	surprise	that	mere	conformity	can	offend.	Of	course	not	every	directing	utterance	succeeds	in	giving	a	directive-reason.		That	is,	not	every	directive	is	valid.		A	valid	directive	is	in	fact	the	reason	that	it	purports	to	be:	a	reason	to	do	or	feel	as	the	directive	directs	because	of	the	directive.		It	is	possible	and	even	common	for	people	to	utter	directing	statements	 that	 do	 not	 constitute	 valid	 directives.	 	 That	 is	people	 can	 fail	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	 give	 directive-reasons.		Left	unexplored	here	is	what	exactly	grounds	the	validity	of	directives:	when	does	directing	others	to	Ф	in	fact	give	those	
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others	 a	 directive-reason	 to	 Ф?	 	 Conditions	 determining	whether	 a	 directive	 is	 valid	 vary,	 and	 can	 include,	 among	other	 conditions,	 relations	 (between	 the	 issuer	 of	 the	directive	 and	 her	 addressee),	 consent	 (to	 be	 subject	 to	 the	directives	 of	 another)	 and	 respect	 for	 those	 issuing	 a	directive.	 	 And	 authoritative	 directives	 have	 their	 own	grounds	of	validity.5		Here	I	 just	assume	that	directives	are,	at	times,	reasons.			Regardless	 of	 what	 grounds	 the	 validity	 of	 directives,	designating	 a	 directive	 as	 valid	 entails	 that	 a	 directive	 is	 a	directive-reason	 of	 some	 normative	 force	 or	 weight.6		 The	normative	weight	of	a	directive-reason	varies	depending	on	the	specific	directive	and	its	context.	 	In	contrast,	an	invalid	directive	is	devoid	of	any	normative	weight	(as	a	directive).	I	 remain	 agnostic	 as	 to	 the	meta-question	 of	 the	 nature	 of	the	relation	between	the	act	of	making	a	directing	illocution	and	the	reason	the	directive	constitutes.	 	Are	we,	as	issuers	of	(valid)	directives,	the	source	of	such	reasons?		That	is,	do	we	 ‘create’	 reasons	 for	 each	 other?	 	 Which	 is	 perhaps	 the	view	 of	 Stephen	 Darwall	 (2006).	 Or,	 do	 our	 directing	illocutions	 simply	 ‘trigger’	 directive-reasons?	 	 Under	 the	latter	view,	the	normative	force	of	directives	derives	from	a	norm	or	some	antecedent-reason	external	to	us,	so	that	our	performance	 of	 directing	 speech	 acts	 is	 a	 factual	 condition	for	 triggering	 a	 directive-reason	 under	 that	 norm	 or	antecedent-reason.7		 Here	 I	 use	 the	 term	 ‘giving-reasons’	with	the	hope	of	bypassing	the	debate.		2.3	What	Is	Not	Deflected		Directing	 speech	 acts	 at	 times	 do	 more	 than	 just	 direct.		While	often	the	giving	of	a	directive-reason	is	the	product	of	a	 directing	 speech	 act	 (such	 as	 urging,	 permitting,	 asking,	suggesting,	 prohibiting,	 requiring,	 demanding,	 advocating,	commanding,	insisting,	blaming,	claiming	and	condemning),																																																														
5	On	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	 legitimacy	 and	 validity	 of	 directives	 of	
political	 authorites	 see	 Rawls	 (1986)	 (reasonable	 consensus);	Christiano	 (2004)	 (democracy);	 Locke	 (1690)	 (consent);	 Raz	(1986)	(instrumentalism).	6 	I	 use	 (normative)	 ‘weight’	 and	 ‘force’	 interchangeably,	 as	stylistically	fitting.	7	On	‘antecedent-reasons’	and	related	ideas	see	Enoch	(2014).		
		 11	
frequently	 the	 same	 speech	 acts	 also	 involve	 additional	types	of	reasons.			Practices	 of	 TAK	 make	 appropriate	 deflecting	 only	 the	
directing	features	of	speech	acts.		A	source	of	mischief	in	the	application	 of	TAK	 practices	 is	 that	 at	 times	 people	 falsely	claim	 that	 hypocrisy,	 meddling	 or	 lack	 of	 status	 make	appropriate	deflecting	all	reasons	featured	in	directives	that	were	 issued	 under	 conditions	 of	 TAK.	 	 To	 understand	 the	deflecting	 function	 of	 standing	 practices	 such	 as	 TAK	 we	should,	 therefore,	clarify	what	 is	and	what	 is	not	subject	 to	this	 appropriate	 deflection.	 	 Accordingly,	 we	 should	distinguish	 directive-reasons	 from	 other	 types	 of	 reasons	relating	to	or	involved	in	directives.		Directives	 of	 course	 do	 not	 exhaust	 the	 reasons	 for	 or	against	a	directive’s	subject	performing	the	directive-object.		Even	 if	 a	 directive	 is	 valid	 and,	 therefore,	 generates	 a	
directive-reason	for	compliance	with	the	directive,	there	may	be	 other	 reasons	 –	 independent	 of	 the	 directive	 –	 both	 in	favor	of	and	against	conformity.			Such	‘independent-reasons’	obtain	 regardless	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 directive	 is	 even	issued.	In	contrast,	directive-reasons	do	not	exist	 independently	of	the	performance	of	 the	directives	 that	generate	 them.	 	The	reason	given	by	the	issuing	of	the	directive	is	the	claim,	the	demand,	the	request	etc.	 	For	example,	an	audience’s	cry	of	“Encore!	 Encore!”	 is	 a	 form	 of	 asking	 or	 encouraging	 a	performer	to	continue	playing,	generating	or	giving	her	new	(directive-)	 reasons	 to	 extend	 her	 recital;	 reasons	 that	 did	not	 exist	 prior	 to	 the	 request.	 	 In	 this	 respect	 (valid)	directives	are	(normatively)	performative,	as	they	introduce	something,	 which	 I	 labeled	 ‘directive-reason’,	 into	 the	normative	 landscape	 that	 was	 not	 there	 prior	 to	 and	independently	of	them.		Some	 speech	 acts	 reference	 what	 I	 just	 referred	 to	 as	‘independent-reasons’,	 that	 is	 they	 point	 out	 reasons	 that	exist	 independently	 of	 being	 pointed	 out.	 	 For	 instance,	
‘expressives’	 such	 as	 communications	 of	 regret,	 wishes,	disdain,	 objection,	 approval,	 hate	 and	 love	 manifest	 or	express	 the	 speaker’s	 sentiments	 or	 attitudes	 (Searle	 and	Vanderveken,	pp.	58-59),	which	of	course	exist	regardless	of	their	 expression.	 	 Such	 sentiments,	 attitudes	 and	 emotions	are	often	 reasons	 for	action	or	 for	emotions.	 	For	example,	
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the	enjoyment	of	the	audience	is	reason	for	the	performer	to	extend	 the	 recital,	 independently	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 the	audience	 expressed	 its	 pleasure	 (e.g.,	 “Bravo!”).	 	 Here	 the	expressive	 merely	 points	 out	 or	 manifests	 the	 audience’s	enjoyment	out	to	the	performer.				Another	 type	 of	 speech	 act	 that	 references	 independent	reasons	 is	 what	 we	 may	 call	 ‘evaluative-assertion’.		
Assertions,	 such	 as	 testimony,	 prediction,	 argument	 or	hypothesis	convey	degrees	of	the	speaker’s	belief	or	attitude	as	to	the	truth-value	of	the	propositional	content	(Searle	and	Vanderveken,	 54-55).	 ‘Evaluative-assertions’	 convey	 the	speaker’s	belief	or	attitude	as	to	the	value	of	a	state	of	affairs.		Here	too	the	reason	referenced	in	the	speech	act	–	the	value	–	is	independent	of	its	assertion.	8		Van	Gogh’s	paintings,	for	example,	 were	 a	 great	 artistic	 achievement	 even	 before	anyone	pointed	out	their	value.	For	our	purposes,	what	we	should	notice	is	that	expressives	and	 evaluative-assertions	 at	 times	 also	 direct.	 	 Not	 all	directives	are	issued	explicitly	(such	as	in	the	case	of	 'close	the	door!'	 or	 'please	do	me	a	 favor').	 	At	 times	 speech	acts	direct	 by	 implication.	 	 Very	 often	 that	 is	 the	 case	 in	expressives	 and	 assertions	of	 evaluations.	 	 For	 example,	 in	addition	 to	 expressing	 his	 sentiments,	 asserting	 his	displeasure	with	Nero’s	style	of	leadership	is	Caligula’s	way	of	implicitly	directing	Nero	to	change	his	ways.		In	fact,	often	the	 primary	 motivation	 for	 an	 expressive	 (positive	 or	negative)	is	to	convey	a	corresponding	directive,	rather	than	to	simply	express	or	point	out	one’s	attitudes	or	sentiments.		Evaluative-assertions	 also	 often	 implicitly	 convey	 a	directive.	 	 In	 asserting	 that	 Nero’s	 leadership	 is	 cruel	 and	irrational	 Caligula	 most	 likely	 does	 more	 than	 merely	convey	his	negative	evaluation	of	Nero’s	leadership.		That	is,	Caligula	 is	 not	 only	 pointing	 out	 to	 Nero	 that	 he	 is	 a	shambolic	 emperor	 and	 correlatively	 has	 reason	 to	 act	differently,	 Caligula	 is	 also	 implicitly	 directing	 –	 asking,	demanding,	urging	etc.	–	Nero	to	change	his	ways.	 	That	 is,	
																																																													
8	I	pose	 ‘belief’	and	 ‘attitude’	as	alternatives	to	signal	agnosticism	as	to	matters	of	the	cognitivism	–	non	cognitivism	distinction.		For	the	cognitivist	perhaps	what	 I	call	 ‘evaluative-assertion’	 is	a	sub-category	of	what	Searle	and	Vanderveken	refer	to	as	‘expressives’.		Here	I	keep	them	distinct.		
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he	also	gives	Caligula	a	directive-reason	in	addition	to	giving	him	a	reason	to	believe	that	he	is	a	horrible	emperor.		There	are	also	speech	acts	that	traverse	the	three	categories	–	 expressing,	 asserting	 and	 directing.	 	 Blaming	 is	 one	example.	 	Another	 is	 condemnation.	 	 Condemnation,	which	featured	 in	 the	Erdogan	 example,	asserts	 the	wrongness	 of	the	 recipient’s	 conduct,	expresses	one’s	 discontent	with	 the	recipient	 and	 with	 his	 conduct,	 as	 well	 as	 directs	 (claims,	suggests,	 or	 demands)	 the	 recipient	 to	 desist	 from	 his	wrongdoing	 as	 well	 as	 urges	 third	 parties	 to	 take	 certain	actions	against	the	recipient	(unlike	blame,	condemnation	is	inherently	 public).	 	 Moreover,	 like	 blaming,	 to	 (validly)	condemn	is	also	to	give	directive-reasons	for	a	certain	set	of	attitudes	 or	 emotions	 (again,	 both	 to	 the	 subject	 of	condemnation	and	to	third	parties).		Accordingly,	these	(and	only	these)	directing	 features	found	in	complex	speech	acts	like	 blaming	 and	 condemnation	 are	 subject	 to	 practices	 of	
TAK.				Although	practices	of	TAK	only	disrupt	directive-reasons,	at	times	people	nefariously	deploy	these	practices	to	negate	all	reasons	 for	 carrying	 out	 the	 directive-object.	 	 Such	 cases	very	 often	 tend	 to	 involve	 expressives	 or	 evaluative-assertions	performed	under	conditions	of	TAK.		For	instance,	what	 gets	 deflected	 is	 not	 only	 the	 directive-reason	constituted	 by	 the	 expressive	 but	also	 the	 reason	 found	 in	the	attitude	or	emotion	that	the	expressive	merely	conveys.		Another	 example	 is	 where	 a	 reason	 that	 is	 given	 by	 some	value	 that	 is	 merely	 asserted	 in	 an	 evaluative-assertion	 is	deflected,	 in	 addition	 to	 deflecting	 the	 illocution’s	 implicit	directing	 features.	 	 Such	 conduct	 clearly	 runs	 afoul	 of	 the	practice	because	it	negates	reasons	that	are	independent	of	a	directive	due	to	circumstances	regarding	the	issuer	of	the	directive.	 	For	 instance,	 returning	 to	 the	 example	 given	 at	the	 outset,	 that	 it	 is	 appropriate	 for	 Assad	 to	 deflect	Erdogan’s	 hypocritical	 condemnation	 –	 in	 its	 function	as	a	
directive	 –	 does	 not	 of	 course	 entail	 that	 Erdogan’s	
evaluation	 of	 Assad	 and	 of	 his	 conduct	 as	 despicable	 is	mistaken,	or	that	Erdogan	is	wrong	about	what	Assad	must	do.	 	All	 that	 is	entailed	is	that	Assad	need	not	do	so	for	the	reason	that	Erdogan	demanded	it.		
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3.	The	Explanans		Let’s	recap.		We	find	in	our	everyday	practices	a	wide	array	of	cases	–	which	I	roughly	grouped	under	the	labels	TAK	–	in	which	deflecting	directives	is	considered	appropriate	where	certain	 facts	 about	 the	 person	 issuing	 the	 directive	 obtain.		Very	 generally,	 these	 facts	 include	hypocrisy,	 lack	of	 status	and	 somehow	 being	 an	 outsider	 to	 the	 matter.	 	 What	 is	deflected	 are	 the	 directive-reasons	 purportedly	 given	 by	those	 issuing	 the	 directives	 under	 the	 aforementioned	compromising	 conditions,	 that	 is	 reasons	 to	 do	 as	 the	directive	directs	because	of	the	directive.	 	In	contrast,	other	types	of	reasons	often	involved	in	directing	illocutions,	such	as	 reasons	 referenced	 in	 directives	 yet	 not	 given	 or	generated	by	 these	directives,	 are	not	 subject	 to	deflection.		Finally,	at	 least	 in	some	 instances	 in	which	we	witness	 this	sort	of	deflection,	were	we	to	view	the	deflectable	directive	in	 isolation	from	the	conditions	of	TAK,	 the	directive	would	seem	perfectly	 valid.	 	 That	 is,	 such	directives	would	be	 the	directive-reasons	 that	 they	 purport	 to	 be.	 	 Accordingly,	conditions	 of	 TAK	 appear	 to	 disrupt	 the	 normativity	 of	directives.				But	what	exactly	is	the	nature	of	this	disruption?		How	does	this	 common	practice	of	 appropriately	deflecting	directives	work?	 	 Returning	 to	 the	 examples	 given	 thus	 far:	 the	
condemnation	 of	 atrocities	 by	 world	 leaders	 seems,	 in	 the	normal	 case,	 a	 reason	 for	 ceasing	 the	 atrocities;	 the	
prescriptions	and	requests	of	the	noblemen	of	Rome	normally	should	 carry	 some	weight	with	 the	 Emperor;	 and	 an	 adult	
demanding	that	a	boy	stop	picking	on	another	child	seems	to	provide	the	boy	with	reason	to	do	so.		What	then	happens	to	the	 normativity	 of	 directives	 in	 cases	 of	 standing	 such	 as	
TAK	that	makes	deflecting	them	appropriate?											3.1	Model	I:	Invalidation	A	 view	 implicit	 in	 much	 of	 the	 relevant	 literature	 is	 that	conditions	such	as	TAK	are	part	of	the	grounds	or	conditions	of	the	validity	of	directives	(Cohen;	Friedman;	Scanlon	2008,	pp.	 175-176;	 Smilansky	 2006;	 Duff,	 2001,	 pp.	 185-188).		According	to	this	view,	in	addition	to	all	other	conditions	for	succeeding	in	issuing	a	valid	directive,	which	vary	from	case	to	 case,	 one	 must	 also	 not	 direct	 others	 hypocritically,	without	the	requisite	status	or	as	an	outsider.	 	Accordingly,	the	 reason	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 deflect	 the	 directives	 of	
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Erdogan,	Caligula,	the	man	scolding	the	child	in	the	park	and	the	 French	 government	 is	 that	 these	 directives	 are	 simply	invalid.		Those	who	utter	them	simply	fail	to	give	the	reasons	that	 they	 attempt	 to	 give.	 	 So	 while	 Assad	 has	 reasons	 to	cease	 the	 atrocities,	 Erdogan’s	 hypocritical	 condemnation	does	not	count	among	those	reasons.	 	And	while	Nero	must	give	regard	 to	 the	reasons	 found	 in	 the	prescriptions	of	his	fellow	noblemen	of	Rome,	this	is	not	the	case	for	the	urgings	of	 Caligula,	 because	 although	 a	 nobleman	 of	 Rome	 his	urgings	 are	 weightless	 (that	 is,	 invalid).	 	 And	 although	 it	should	 consider	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Scottish	 Parliament	regarding	the	British	Monarchy,	the	British	government	may	deflect	offhand	similar	demands	when	voiced	by	the	French	government	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 they	 are	 normatively	weightless,	because	it	is	just	not	France’s	business.								Although	I	think	intuitive	for	many,	closer	inspection	reveals	that	 the	 invalidation	model	 fails	 to	capture	a	key	 feature	of	
TAK	practices	and	of	standing	generally.		Demonstrating	this	takes	 some	 doing,	 especially	 given	 that	 many	 seem	 to	naturally	 gravitate	 towards	 the	 invalidation	 model.		Basically,	I	show	that	directives	can	project	normative	force	and	 feature	 in	 our	 reasoning	 even	 when	 issued	 under	conditions	 of	 TAK;	 that	 is	 even	 when	 issued	 without	standing.		I	argue	from	two	different	types	of	cases.		I	call	the	first	“waiver”	and	the	second	“traces.”			
3.1.1	Against	the	Invalidation	Model:	Waiver		In	cases	 like	those	appearing	 in	the	various	examples	given	above,	 although	 it	 would	 be	 appropriate	 or	 okay	 for	directive-subjects	 to	 deflect	 directives	 issued	 under	 the	conditions	 of	 TAK,	 they	 nevertheless	 have	 the	 option	 of	taking	such	directives	into	account	and	of	relying	on	them	as	a	 guide	 for	 their	 actions.	 	 For	 example,	 a	 good	 friend	may	say,	“I’m	sorry,	I	know	I'm	the	last	person	who	can	ask	this	of	you	 but…”	 or	 “I	 know	 it’s	 none	 of	 my	 business,	 yet…”	 To	which	one	may	 respond,	 “We’re	 friends,	 don’t	worry	 about	it,”	 and	 then	 go	 on	 to	 consider	 the	 friend’s	 request	 as	 a	reason	 for	 compliance	 with	 the	 request,	 the	 friend’s	hypocrisy,	 or	 lack	 of	 status,	 or	 meddling	 notwithstanding.		Or	think	of	parents	pleading	with	their	young	adult	daughter	not	to	take	up	smoking.		If	the	parents	were	also	smokers	it	seems	that	their	daughter	could	deflect	their	plea	on	account	of	their	hypocrisy.		Yet,	sensing	the	force	of	the	parental	plea,	were	 the	 daughter	 to	 decide	 to	 comply	 –	 not	 to	 smoke	
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because	 her	 parents	 asked	 –	 and	 not	 to	 exercise	 her	prerogative	 to	 deflect	 her	 parents’	 hypocritical	 request,	there	would	be	nothing	irrational	in	doing	so.9	In	 order	 to	 rationally	 function	 as	 a	 reason,	 directives	must	have	 some	 normative	 force	 for	 agents	 to	 be	 guided	 by.		Acknowledging	 that	directive-subjects	may	 rationally	 guide	their	 conduct	 based	 on	 directives	 issued	 hypocritically	 or	through	meddling	or	without	the	requisite	status	entails	that	directives	 issued	 under	 such	 conditions	 have	 normative	force,	 yielding	 the	 conclusion	 that	 such	 conditions	 are	 not	conditions	of	 invalidation,	as	 they	obviously	do	not	void	or	condition	a	directive’s	normativity.		Considering	 that	 waiver	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 practices	 of	 TAK	suggests	 that	 such	 practices	 operate	 under	 the	 assumption	that	conditions	of	TAK	do	not	void	directives.	 	 If	all	or	even	most	 directives	 issued	 under	 conditions	 of	 TAK	 were	necessarily	 invalid,	 an	 implausible	 and	 revisionary	conclusion	 would	 follow:	 that	 the	 very	 familiar	 practice	 of	acting	 and	 deliberating	 on	 the	 force	 of	 directives	 issued	under	 such	 conditions	 is	 irrational	 –	 because	 if	 directives	issued	under	such	conditions	were	necessarily	invalid,	there	would	be	nothing	in	those	directives	to	rationally	guide	one	or	to	act	upon.	Rising	 to	 the	 defense	 of	 the	 invalidation	 model,	 the	interlocutor	might	claim	that	while	it	is	true	that	the	people	in	my	examples	are	acting	 rationally,	 the	 reasons	on	which	they	are	acting	are	not	the	aforementioned	directives.	 	And,	accordingly,	we	can	account	for	the	examples	without	having	to	reject	 the	 invalidation	model.	Basically	 the	 interlocutor’s	tactic	is	to	flood	the	examples	with	different	reasons	for	the	same	 action,	 thereby	making	 directive-reasons	 superfluous	for	explaining	the	examples.	For	 instance,	 returning	 to	 the	 example	 of	 the	 smoking	daughter,	 the	 interlocutor	 may	 believe	 that	 we	 need	 not	revert	 to	 directive-reasons	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 daughter’s	behavior	 is	rational.	 	Perhaps	the	daughter’s	reason	for	not	smoking	 is	 to	 avoid	 causing	 her	 parents	 distress.	 	 Which	certainly	 appears	 a	 weighty	 enough	 reason	 to	 color	 the	daughter’s	behavior	 rational	without	having	 to	also	rely	on																																																														
9	By	 ‘irrational’	 I	mean	open	to	rational	criticism.	Parfit	 (1986,	p.	119)				
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directive-reasons.	 	 Let’s	 call	 this	 objection	 ‘distress.’	 	 Or	maybe,	even	if	we	were	to	take	the	daughter’s	account	of	her	own	actions	at	face	value	–	that	she	avoids	smoking	because	her	 parents	 asked	 her	 to	 –	we	 can	 still	 explain	 her	 actions	without	 reverting	 to	 directive-reasons.	 	 Perhaps	 even	 if	invalid,	were	 she	 to	 ignore	 her	 parents’	 request	 she	would	cause	 them	 offence.	 	 Let’s	 call	 this	 objection	 ‘insult.’	 	 Both	‘distress’	and	‘insult’	appear	to	involve	a	plausibly	sufficient	(non-directive-)	 reason	 for	 the	 daughter	 to	 avoid	 smoking,	regardless	 of	 whether	 she	 has	 any	 further	 (directive-	 or	otherwise)	reasons	to	do	so.			However,	 neither	 objection	 nor	 the	 interlocutor’s	 overall	tactic	will	do.	 	Notice	 first	 that	 the	question	 is	not	whether	we	 can	 play	 around	 with	 the	 example	 so	 that	 it	accommodates	 the	 invalidation	 model,	 but	 rather	 whether	my	version	of	the	example	makes	sense.	 	Because	if	 it	does,	then	 it	 gives	 strong	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 invalidation	model	 is	 false.	 	 Notice	 also	 that	 the	 interlocutor’s	reformulation	 –	 the	 adding	 of	 non-directive-reasons	 to	 the	example	–	demonstrates	neither	that	the	invalidation	model	is	correct	nor	disproves	the	presence	of	directive-reasons	in	the	example.		Rather,	it	only	demonstrates	that	we	can	color	the	 daughter’s	 conduct	 rational	 without	 reverting	 to	directive-reasons.	 	Which	is	consistent	with	the	presence	of	directive-reasons	in	the	example.		For	instance,	perhaps	it	is	a	case	of	over	determination.		The	 question,	 therefore,	 is	 whether	 my	 version	 of	 the	example	 rings	 true.	 	 Is	 the	 interlocutor	 correct	 that	 all	instances	 of	 the	 example	 are	 explainable	without	 reverting	to	directive-reasons?		If	so,	the	‘waiver’	objection	falls	short	of	knocking	down	or	even	weakening	the	invalidation	model.		Or,	 are	 there	 conditions	under	which	 it	 is	 natural,	 familiar,	and	sensible	for	the	daughter	to	say	that	she	decided	not	to	smoke	 (also)	 out	 of	 compliance	 with	 her	 parents’	 request,	their	hypocrisy	not	withstanding;	that	is,	cases	in	which	the	most	plausible	explanation	of	why	the	daughter’s	behavior	is	rational	 features	 the	 parent’s	 request	 as	 a	 directive-reason	for	 action.	 	 If	 so,	 it	 gives	 strong	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	invalidation	model	is	false.			Let’s	 begin	 with	 ‘distress,’	 according	 to	 which	 while	 the	daughter	 may	 believe	 that	 she	 is	 avoiding	 smoking	 (also)	because	 her	 parents	 asked	 her,	 in	 fact	 her	 real	 reason	 for	doing	 so	 (perhaps	 even	 unbeknownst	 to	 her)	 is	 avoiding	causing	her	parents	distress.		One	thing	counting	against	this	
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objection,	given	the	example’s	formulation,	is	that	it	distorts	what	 appears	 the	 most	 sensible	 explanation	 of	 the	daughter’s	behavior	–	her	 reasons	 to	avoid	 smoking	 is	 that	her	parents	asked	her	to	do	so.		Moreover,	 we	 could	 set	 up	 a	 more	 fanciful	 version	 of	 the	example	 that	 better	 fleshes	 out	 the	 presence	 of	 directive-reasons	 in	 the	 daughter’s	 deliberations.	 	 Imagine	 the	daughter	 has	 a	 twin	 sister	 who	 also	 wishes	 to	 take	 up	smoking.	 	 Now	 while	 both	 daughters	 are	 aware	 of	 their	parents’	grave	feelings	as	to	the	prospect	of	their	children’s	smoking,	only	one	daughter	was	actually	pleaded	with	not	to	do	 so.	 	 Thus,	while	 the	 parents’	 distress	 is	 reason	 for	 both	daughters	 not	 to	 smoke,	 only	 one	 sister	 has	 the	 additional	reason	of	having	been	asked.		Now	suppose	that	the	parents’	feelings	are	not	reason	enough	to	obligate	the	daughters	not	to	 smoke,	 as	 those	 reasons	 are	 overridden	 by	 competing	reasons	–	for	instance	the	daughters’	enjoyment	and	sense	of	independence.	 	It	is	only	the	extra	normative	force	found	in	the	 request	 –	 the	 directive-reason	 –	 that	 flips	 matters	 in	favor	 of	 a	 duty	 not	 to	 smoke.	 	 Accordingly,	 while	 one	daughter	may	smoke	the	other	mustn’t.			Now	what	 if	 the	parental	 request	was	hypocritical?	 	Under	the	 invalidation	 model	 the	 two	 sisters	 stand	 in	 the	 exact	same	normative	position	vis-à-vis	 the	matter	of	whether	or	not	 to	 smoke.	 	 But	 here's	 the	 rub.	 	 Let’s	 assume	 that	 the	sister	who	was	asked	not	to	smoke	chooses	to	disregard	her	parents’	hypocrisy	and	to	take	guidance	from	their	request;	and	 that	 she	 would	 thereby	 feel	 obligated	 not	 to	 smoke.		Would	she	be	thereby	irrational?		Would	she	be	inventing	a	(directive-)reason	 and	 thereby	 also	 an	 obligation	 that	 are	simply	 not	 there?	 	 Is	 the	 normative	 position	 of	 the	 two	daughters	 really	 no	different	 given	 the	 choice	 to	waive	 the	parents’	lack	of	standing?		I	believe	the	natural	answer	to	all	three	questions	is	“no”.		Given	that	we	already	accounted	for	the	normative	 force	of	 the	parents’	distress,	acknowledging	that	 the	 parents’	 hypocritical	 request	 is	 valid	 is	 the	 most	plausible	 explanation	 for	 why	 the	 daughter’s	 sense	 of	obligation	 is	 rational	 and	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 reasons	that	apply	to	each	one	of	the	sisters.		Now	 to	 ‘insult.’	 	 Recall	 that	 the	 objection	 is	 that	 the	daughter’s	 reason	 for	 not	 smoking	 is	 not	 her	 parents’	hypocritical	 request	 itself,	 but	 rather	 is	 avoiding	 the	eventuality	of	insulting	her	parents	were	she	to	ignore	their	request.	 	 Thus,	 it	 follows	 that	 while	 the	 daughter	 may	
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rationally	decide	to	avoid	smoking	because	her	parents	asked	
her,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 entail	 that	 in	 doing	 so	 she	 is	acting	out	of	compliance	with	her	parents’	request	that	is,	is	acting	 on	 a	 directive-reason.	 	 Rather,	 according	 to	 the	objection	the	daughter’s	reason	 for	not	smoking	 is	 to	avoid	insulting	 her	 parents	 given	 their	 request.	 	 According	 to	 the	interlocutor	 we	 can,	 therefore,	 explain	 the	 daughter’s	behavior	–	not	smoking	because	her	parents	asked	her	–	as	rational	 without	 knocking	 down	 or	 even	 weaken	 the	invalidation	model.		But	again,	the	question	is	not	whether	we	can	reinterpret	the	example	so	that	it	accommodates	the	invalidation	model,	but	rather	 whether	 my	 version	 of	 the	 example	 rings	 true.	 	 So	once	 again	 the	 trick	 is	 to	 add	 a	 little	 detail	 to	 the	 example	while	 maintaining	 its	 plausibility.	 	 Assume,	 therefore,	 that	the	parents	only	care	about	their	daughter	avoiding	smoking	and	 couldn’t	 care	 less	 why	 she	 does	 so	 –	 whether	 it	 is	because	she	was	asked	or	for	any	other	reason.	 	Under	this	version	of	the	example	the	interlocutor	cannot	interpret	the	daughter’s	 account	 of	 her	 own	 reasoning	 –	 that	 she	 is	avoiding	smoking	because	her	parents	asked	–	to	mean	that	the	daughter	aims	 to	avoid	 insulting	her	parents.	 	Yet	even	having	removed	the	risk	of	offending	as	a	reason	for	doing	as	the	 parents	 requested,	 the	 daughter	 still	 seems	 rational	 in	avoiding	smoking	because	her	parents	asked	her	to.	 	And	the	most	 plausible	 account	 of	 why	 that	 is,	 is	 that	 she	 is	complying	with	her	parents’	hypocritical	 request.	 	Meaning	that	 she	 is	 acting	 on	 a	 directive-reason,	 thereby	 pointing	towards	the	falsity	of	the	invalidation	model.										At	 this	 juncture,	 still	 attempting	 to	 save	 the	 invalidation	model	 from	 my	 ‘waiver’	 critique,	 the	 interlocutor	 might	mount	a	new	line	of	defense	according	to	which	–	in	the	case	of	 directives	 issued	 under	 TAK	 –	 the	 directive-subject	waiving	 the	 invalidation	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	directive’s	 validity.	 	 Following	 this	 amendment	 to	 the	invalidation	 model,	 it	 follows	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 all	 other	conditions	of	validity	a	directive	is	valid	if	and	only	if:	(a)	it	was	issued	by	a	person	who	conforms	with	the	principles	of	
TAK	or	(b)	if	issued	without	such	conformity,	if	the	directive-subject	willingly	waives	the	directive's	invalidity.					Yet	the	interlocutor’s	defense	of	the	invalidation	model	does	not	cohere	with	the	reasoning	often	leading	to	the	waiver	in	the	first	place.		When	directive-subjects	choose	to	be	guided	by	directives	that	were	issued	under	conditions	of	TAK	they	
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often	do	so	because	of	 the	normative	 force	that	 they	detect	in	the	directive.		For	example,	it	is	because	it	is	the	request	of	a	good	friend	or	the	demand	of	one’s	mother	(as	opposed	to	mere	 acquaintances)	 that	 one	 chooses	 to	 overlook	 their	hypocrisy	or	meddling	and	consider	 their	directives	on	 the	merits.	 	 This	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 directive	 is	 considered	valid	 prior	 to	 the	waiver,	 as	 it	 is	 taken	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 the	waiver.		Moreover,	 assuming	 a	 directive	 that	 –	 but	 for	 issues	 of	standing	–	would	have	been	valid,	why	would	the	validity	of	that	 a	 directive	 –	 when	 issued	 without	 standing	 –	 depend	entirely	(or	at	all)	on	the	consent	of	the	directive’s	subject?		The	interlocutor’s	proposed	patch	for	the	invalidation	model	entails	 that	 the	 directive-subject’s	 consent	 to	 be	 subject	 to	the	invalidated	directive	somehow	(re)validates	it.	 	Yet	I	do	not	 think	 the	 directive-subject’s	 consent	 can	 fix	 issues	 of	standing,	 at	 least	 not	 on	 its	 own	 and	 certainly	 not	 always.		Exploring	what	grounds	standing	practices	such	as	TAK	goes	beyond	the	parameters	of	this	paper,	which	aims	to	capture	the	 normative	 structure	 of	 standing	 practices,	 not	 their	justification.	 	 Yet	 on	 the	 face	 of	 things	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	these	 grounds	 likely	 include	 various	 values	 and	 interests	that	 are	 at	 least	 not	 solely	 about	 the	 consent	 (or	 lack	thereof)	 of	 directive-subjects.	 	 It	 is	 therefore	 likely	 that	reasons	 other	 than	 consent	 are	 often	 also	 or	 perhaps	 even	exclusively	involved	in	determining	when	we	have	standing	to	intervene.		Accordingly,	a	directive-subject’s	consent	to	be	subject	 to	 a	 directive	 is	 most	 likely	 not,	 in	 and	 of	 itself,	sufficient	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 invalidation	 –	 assumed	 in	 the	invalidation	 model	 –	 of	 directives	 issued	 without	 the	requisite	 standing;	 at	 least	 not	 always.	 	 The	 interlocutor’s	response	 to	 the	 waiver	 objection	 attributes	 to	 directive-subjects	powers	that	they	most	likely	often	do	not	possess.								
3.1.2	Against	the	Invalidation	Model:	Traces			Also	 cutting	 against	 the	 invalidation	model	 is	 the	 fact	 that	when	 conditions	 of	TAK	 make	 the	 deflecting	 of	 a	 directive	appropriate	we	still	sometimes	find	in	our	practices	traces	of	the	normativity	of	that	directive	(as	a	directive),	suggesting	that	 our	 practices	 assume	 that	 the	 directive	 is	 a	 directive-
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reason,	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 its	 deflection	notwithstanding.		I	next	flesh	out	such	traces.10			Let’s	 return	 to	 the	 example	 of	 the	 smoking	 adult	 daughter.		For	 now,	 assume	 that	 her	 parents	 are	 not	 themselves	smokers.		In	the	normal	case,	if	parents	worried	about	their	child’s	health	implore	their	young	adult	daughter	not	to	take	up	smoking	 they	give	 their	daughter	a	directive-reason	not	to	become	a	smoker.		That	is,	the	young	woman	has	a	reason	(among	many	other	reasons)	not	to	take	up	smoking,	which	is	 that	 her	 parents	 asked.	 	 In	 some	 cases	 such	 a	 reason	 –	when	 sufficiently	weighty	 and	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 overriding	reasons	–	would	give	rise	to	an	obligation	of	the	child	to	her	parents	not	to	take	up	smoking.	Now,	 what	 happens	 if	 the	 child	 nevertheless	 becomes	 a	smoker,	 thereby	 breaching	 her	 obligation	 to	 her	 parents?		Once	 breached,	 she	 cannot	 ‘unbreach’	 the	 obligation	 –	 she	already	 became	 a	 smoker.	 	 In	 such	 cases	 a	 new	 obligation	would	most	 likely	 arise	 –	 an	 obligation	 to	 do	 the	next	best	
thing	 in	 order	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 parents’	 request.	 	 For	instance,	the	child	would	presumably	be	under	an	obligation	to	 her	 parents	 to	 quit	 smoking.	 	 Quitting	 smoking	 is	 a	second-best	 obligation	 because	 it	 only	 partially	 complies	with	 the	 parents’	 directive.	 	 Only	 not	 having	 taken	 up	smoking	 in	 the	 first	place	would	have	been	 fully	compliant.		To	 understand	 how	 the	 same	 fact/reason	 can	 ground	different	obligations	one	must	realize	that	rationality	allows	for	partial	compliance.		One	can	be	more	or	less	rational	and	compliance	with	 a	 reason	 is	 a	matter	 of	 degree	 (Raz	2004,	pp.	189-193).	Thus,	once	the	first	obligation	is	breached	the	best	 way	 to	 comply	 with	 her	 parents’	 directive	 not	 to	become	a	smoker	is	forever	blocked.		Yet	that	does	not	entail	that	the	parental	directive	ceases	to	project	normative	force	or	is	entirely	beyond	compliance.		Once	the	first	obligation	is	breached	 a	 second	 obligation	 arises	 out	 of	 the	 same	facts/reasons	 that	 grounded	 the	 first	 obligation.	 	 This	second-best	obligation	is	to	do	what	 is	rationally	possible	–	in	the	post-breach	world	–	to	best	comply	with	the	parents’	directive.	 	Breaching	this	second-best	obligation	would	lead	to	 a	 third-best	obligation	and	 so	on	down	 the	 rational	 line.																																																															
10	Taking	 inspiration	 from	 John	Gardner’s	account	of	 the	 relation	between	primary	and	secondary	obligations.		Gardner	(2011).	And	from	Raz	(2004,	pp.	189-193).	
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For	 instance,	 was	 the	 daughter	 to	 continue	 smoking	 she	would	 then	have	obligations	such	as	 to	smoke	 low	nicotine	cigarettes	and	not	to	smoke	in	her	parents’	presence.		While	fulfilling	these	obligations	would	of	course	not	 fully	comply	with	her	parents’	 request,	 it	 is	still	better	 than	nothing	and	more	 rational	per	 the	request.	 	 Naturally	 at	 some	point	 the	only	 available	 compliance	 with	 the	 directive	 becomes	 so	negligible	 that	 it	 is	 effectively	 of	 no	 normative	 significance	and	no	further	obligations	arise	out	of	that	directive.			Now	 let’s	 reintroduce	 conditions	 of	 tu	 quoque	 into	 the	example.	 	 It	 turns	 out	 the	 parents	 are	 themselves	 smokers	and	have	 ignored	 their	 daughter’s	many	past	 requests	 that	
they	 quit.	 	 Arguably,	 when	 confronted	 with	 her	 parents’	directive	 regarding	 her	 own	 smoking	 the	 adult	 daughter	 is	entitled	 to	 the	 tu	quoque	response	 –	 ‘you	 too!’	 –	 deflecting	her	 parents’	 directive.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 daughter’s	obligation	to	her	parents	not	to	smoke	would,	in	some	sense,	cease	to	bind	her.	 	That	said,	and	this	is	key,	it	seems	to	me	that	 even	 accepting	 the	 practice	 of	 deflecting	 hypocritical	requests,	 the	 daughter’s	 derivative	 third-	 and	 fourth-best	obligations	 still	 apply	 to	 her,	 the	 parents’	 hypocrisy	notwithstanding.	 	 That	 is,	 the	 obligations	 to	 smoke	 low	nicotine	cigarettes	or	not	to	smoke	in	front	of	her	parents,	do	not	appear	appropriately	deflectable.		The	fact	that,	unlike	her	upstream	obligations,	the	daughter’s	downstream	obligations	are	not	appropriately	deflectable	in	this	case	does	not	cohere	with	 the	 invalidation	model.	 	The	most	 natural	 explanation	 of	 the	 daughter’s	 downstream	obligations	is	that	they	arise	from	the	normative	force	of	the	parents’	 directive.	 	 That	 is,	 what	 grounds	 the	 daughter’s	obligation	 to	 her	 parents	 not	 to	 smoke	 in	 their	 presence	include	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 parents	 asked	 her	 not	 to	 take	 up	smoking.	 	 If	 the	 practice	 of	 tu	 quoque	 involved	 the	invalidation	of	the	request,	it	would	follow	that	our	practices	would	 not	 recognize	 any	 trace	 of	 the	 normativity	 of	 the	parents’	 supposedly	 invalid	 request.	 	 But	 if	 you	 accept	my	account	of	the	example,	which	suggests	that	only	some	of	the	daughter’s	 obligations	 deriving	 from	 the	 hypocritical	directive	 are	 appropriately	 deflectable,	 it	 appears	 that	 our	practice	of	tu	quoque	does	allow	for	such	a	trace,	as	found	in	the	 daughter’s	 undeflectable	 downstream	 obligations.	 	 The	invalidation	 model	 does	 not,	 therefore,	 fit	 the	 whole	phenomena	of	TAK.			
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3.1.2	The	Invalidation	Model:	Conclusion				Under	 the	 invalidation	model	 standing	norms	are	norms	of	(normative)	power.	 	Normative	power	is	the	ability	to	alter	aspects	of	the	normative	landscape.		For	example,	I	have	the	ability	 to	 (normatively)	 bind	 myself	 to	 others	 through	promising.		The	ability	to	command	involves	another	type	of	normative	 power,	 often	 called	 “authority.”	 	 Our	 normative	powers	presumably	include	the	ability	to	sometimes	validly	direct	 others,	 that	 is,	 to	 give	 directive-reasons.	 	 Under	 the	invalidation	model	norms	of	standing	are	norms	of	power	in	that	they	condition	the	power	to	direct.			Notice,	 therefore,	 that	 rejecting	 the	 invalidation	 model	suggests	 a	 somewhat	 radical	 conclusion,	 which	 is	 that	 (at	least	 in	 our	 practices)	 norms	 of	 standing	 are	 different	 and	can	 disconnect	 from	 norms	 of	 validity,	 such	 as	 norms	 of	authority	 and	 other	 types	 of	 normative	 powers.	 	 Thus	‘standing’	 is	 an	 independent	 and	 unique	 –	 and	 mostly	overlooked	 –	 normative	 category.	 	 Accordingly,	 it	 seems	possible,	 for	 instance,	 to	 hold	 the	 authority	 to	 issue	 valid	directives	 and	 still,	 nevertheless,	 have	 one's	 directives	appropriately	 deflected	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 one	 lacks	 the	standing	 to	 exercise	 one's	 authority. 11 		 In	 other	 words,	validity	and	standing	come	apart.			3.2	Model	II:	Competition	Another	possible	 explanation	of	 the	normative	 structure	 of	the	 appropriateness	 of	 deflecting	 directives	 issued	 under	circumstances	of	meddling,	hypocrisy	or	lack	of	status	is	that	these	circumstances	provide	reasons	not	to	act	or	deliberate	on	 the	reasons	manifested	 in	such	directives.	 	For	 instance,	perhaps	 the	 apparent	 wrongfulness	 involved	 in	 directing	under	 such	 conditions	 is	 reason	 to	deflect	 those	directives.		Here	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 deflection's	 appropriateness	 is	that	 it	 is	 a	product	of	 a	 competition	of	 reasons,	 and	 that	 in	some	 cases	 the	 reasons	 to	 deflect	 a	 directive-reason	outweigh	 that	 directive-reason.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 here	deflecting	is	appropriate	because	reason	requires	it.		
																																																													
11	I	 take	 Anthony	 Duff’s	 account	 of	 the	 state’s	 standing	 to	 hold	criminals	accountable	as	charting	an	instance	of	such	a	divergence	of	validity	(in	this	case	state	authority)	from	standing	(Duff	2010).	
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Competition	has	a	different	logic	than	invalidation.	 	When	a	certain	 fact	 is	 taken	 as	 a	 reason	 against	 complying	 with	 a	directive,	 that	 reason	–	 following	 the	 logic	of	competition	–	may	or	may	not	outweigh	the	directive-reason.	 	In	contrast,	if	 taken	as	a	case	of	 invalidation,	 that	 fact	 is	a	condition	for	the	directive	constituting	a	directive-reason	of	any	weight.	Yet	 the	 competition	 model	 also	 fails	 to	 capture	 what	 we	typically	 see	 in	 practices	 of	 TAK.	 	 This	 is	 apparent	 in	 the	reasoning	 process	 that	 accompanies	 the	 deflection:	 (i)	assessing	 whether	 the	 conditions	 of	 TAK	 apply,	 such	 as	whether	or	not	the	party	issuing	the	directive	is	sticking	his	nose	 into	 matters	 that	 do	 not	 concern	 him,	 and	 then	 (ii)	reaching	a	conclusion	about	the	appropriateness	of	ignoring	the	directive.	 	That	is,	upon	determining	the	applicability	of	the	 relevant	 circumstances	 of	 TAK	 one	 need	 not,	 and	 in	practice	 mostly	 does	 not,	 incorporate	 into	 one’s	deliberations	judgments	on	the	weight	or	even	the	validity	of	the	 directive	 when	 determining	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	appropriate	 to	 deflect	 it.	 	 The	 appropriateness	 of	disregarding	directives	does	not	appear,	therefore,	a	product	of	 a	 clash	 of	 reasons	 for	 and	 against	 compliance	 with	 the	directives.	 	 Something	 else	 is	 going	 on	 here	 that	 approves	the	deflection.			For	example,	 a	 friend	calls	me	up	 to	ask	 that	 I	drive	her	 to	the	airport	tomorrow.		This	is	the	same	friend	that	routinely	refuses	similar	favors.		She	is,	in	other	words,	a	‘bad	friend’,	but	a	 friend	nonetheless.	 	Were	 I	 to	 turn	down	her	request	on	account	of	her	hypocrisy	I	would	not	be	turning	her	down	because	 I	 found	 that	 her	 hypocrisy	 is	 a	 stronger	 reason	(against	compliance)	than	the	reason	given	by	her	directive	(for	compliance).	 	Rather,	 it	would	be	appropriate	 if	 I	were	to	 –	 once	 I	 identify	 the	 hypocrisy	 and	 without	 further	reflection	on	the	weight	of	her	request		–	inform	her	that	she	is	 in	no	position	 to	 ask	 that	 of	me	 and	 to	 simply	disregard	her	request.	Moreover,	had	the	process	of	deliberation	 in	such	practices	involved	 counterbalancing	 the	 normative	 weight	 of,	 for	example,	the	wrongness	of	the	hypocrisy	or	of	the	meddling	against	 the	 normative	weight	 of	 the	 directive,	 the	 scope	 of	the	 appropriateness	 of	 disregarding	 different	 directives	 –	even	 if	 issued	 under	 similar	 conditions	 of	 hypocrisy	 or	meddling	or	lack	of	status	–	would	most	likely	have	diverged	between	 normatively	 weaker	 and	 stronger	 directives,	
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requiring	disregarding	more	of	the	former	type	of	directives	than	 of	 the	 latter.	 	 This	 is	 because,	 all	 things	 being	 equal,	normatively	stronger	directives	would	more	often	defeat	the	reasons	for	deflection	than	would	weaker	directives.	 	Yet	in	practice	we	see	no	such	deviation.		This	further	suggests	that	the	appropriateness	of	the	deflection	is	not	predicated	on	a	competition	 of	 reasons.	 	 The	normativity	 of	 ‘the	 deflection’	must,	 therefore,	work	differently.	 	 For	 example,	 normally	 a	request	 to	 drive	 one	 to	 the	 airport	 packs	 more	 normative	punch	when	made	by	a	close	 friend	than	by	a	more	distant	friend.		Still,	if	both	friends	regularly	refuse	favors	to	others,	in	 practice	 the	 tu	quoque	response	 seems	 equally	 available	against	 both	 of	 them	 regardless	 of	 the	 varying	 weights	 of	their	directives.		Finally,	 the	 logic	 of	 competition	 does	 not	 cohere	 with	 the	possibility	 of	 waiving	 the	 option	 to	 deflect.	 	 Had	 the	normativity	 of	 TAK	 practices	 been	 that	 of	 competition,	deflectability	would	not	have	been	a	matter	of	discretion	but	of	what	reason	requires	on	balance.		3.3	Model	III:	Alteration	The	 discretionary	 feature	 of	 TAK	 leads	 to	 a	 third	 model.		Perhaps	 circumstances	 of	 TAK	 do	 not	 invalidate	 directives	but	 rather	 merely	 alter	 their	 normative	 nature?	 	 Namely,	maybe	 instead	 of	 constituting	 directive-reasons,	 directives	issued	 under	 the	 aforementioned	 circumstances	 are	 what	may	 be	 called	 ‘optional-directive-reasons’,	 that	 is	 directive-reasons	 that	 make	 their	 own	 normative	 force	 somehow	discretionary.		This	could	presumably	explain	the	cases	that	were	 the	 downfall	 of	 the	 invalidation	 and	 competition	models:	cases	involving	a	choice	between	either	deflecting	a	directive	(i.e.,	treating	it	as	weightless)	or	incorporating	the	directive-reason	 into	 one’s	 practical	 deliberations	 (i.e.,	taking	guidance	from	the	directive’s	actual	normative	force).		Seemingly	incompatible	with	practices	of	TAK,	reasons	seem	to	have	an	ought-making	or	requiring	feature.		I	do	not	mean	by	this	that	all	reasons	are	overriding	reasons	or	all-things-considered	conclusive,	only	that	when	one	has	a	reason	to	Ф	that	reason	is	part	of	the	normative	landscape	that	counts	in	relation	to	whether	or	not	one	ought	to	Ф.		Yet,	as	described	above,	when	we	appropriately	deflect	a	directive	we	behave	as	if	that	directive	does	not	at	all	constitute	a	reason	and	is	not	 at	 all	 a	 factor	 contributing	 to	 what	 we	 ought	 to	 do.		
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Nevertheless,	 as	 established	 above,	 this	 practice	 of	deflection	also	seems	to	assume	that	the	deflected	directive	is	still	a	reason.		How	can	this	be?				Perhaps	 then	 what	 is	 assumed	 in	 the	 practice	 is	 that	 the	reason	 constituted	 by	 a	 directive	 issued	 under	circumstances	of	TAK	is	altered,	losing	the	‘ought-making’	or	‘requiring’	feature	it	would	have	had,	all	else	being	equal,	but	for	 the	 circumstances	 of	TAK.	 	 Put	 differently,	 perhaps	 the	transformed	 directives	 are	 still	 taken	 to	 count	 as	 reasons,	only	 that	 they	 are	 discountable,	 so	 that	 part	 of	 the	normativity	 of	 such	directives	 is	 that	 directive-subjects	 are	permitted	to	ignore	them,	even	in	the	absence	of	any	equally	strong	(or	stronger)	opposing	reason.		Accordingly,	perhaps	what	explains	the	appropriateness	of	 ‘the	deflection’	 is	 that	under	 conditions	 of	 TAK	 directives	 are	 considered	 to	 lose	their	 ought-making	 features,	 thereby	 making	 their	 own	deflection	 permissible.	 	 This	 would	 capture	 both	 the	deflection	and	the	waiver	features	of	TAK.12												But	does	this	proposal	even	make	sense?		Is	not	a	requiring	or	ought-making	feature	a	necessary	condition	for	counting	as	a	reason?		Some	think	not.	 	For	example,	Jonathan	Dancy	distinguishes	 between	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘preemptory	 reasons’	and	 ‘enticing	 reasons’.	 	 Preemptory	 reasons	 contribute	 to	what	 one	 ought	 to	 do.	 	 In	 contrast,	 while	 enticing	 reasons	count	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 certain	 action,	 they	 do	 not	 contribute	towards	 making	 it	 what	 one	 ought	 to	 do.	 	 Thus,	 enticers	count	 in	 favor	 of	 something,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 making	 it	attractive,	 without	 contributing	 to	 making	 it	 required.		Accordingly,	enticing	reasons	can	be	rationally	discounted	or	ignored	 (Dancy	 2004),	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 weightier	reasons.									In	a	 similar	vein,	Patricia	Greenspan	distinguishes	between	“positive”	 and	 “negative”	 reasons	 (Greenspan	 2007).																																																															
12	I	can’t	claim	allies	for	this	view	or	for	the	view	I	endorse	in	the	next	 section.	 	 However,	 some	 use	 the	 term	 ‘standing’	 to	 explain	the	 nature	 of	 hypocritical	 blaming	 or	 condemning,	 and	 some	understandings	 of	 ‘standing’	 are	 incompatible	 with	 the	invalidation	model.		Those	who	I	expect	would	endorse	something	along	 the	 lines	 of	what	 I	 called	 the	 ‘alteration’	 or	 the	 ‘exclusion’	models	 and	would	 reject	 the	 invalidation	model	 are	 Bell	 (2012)	and	Duff	(2010).	
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Negative	reasons	count	against,	for	example,	certain	actions.		Positive	reasons	–	that	is	reasons	in	favor	of	something	–	are	normally	explainable	in	terms	of	negative	reasons	–	that	is	in	terms	 of	 considerations	 against	 alternatives	 to	 the	 action	that	 they	 require.	 	 Nevertheless,	 Greenspan	 recognizes	 a	category	 of	what	 she	 calls	 “purely	 positive	 reasons,”	which	are	 reasons	 that	 count	 in	 favor	 of	 something	 without	counting	 against	 anything.	 	 Such	 reasons	 qualify	 or	recommend	 a	 choice	 without	 disqualifying	 competing	options.	 	 They	 are	 the	 sort	 of	 reasons	 that	 ground	permissions,	not	‘oughts’	and	obligations.	Also	 helpful	 is	 Joshua	 Gert’s	 distinction	 between	 the	“justifying”	 and	 the	 “requiring”	 features	 of	 reasons	 (Gert	2007).	According	 to	Gert	one	aspect	of	 reasons	 is	 that	 they	make	 certain	 actions	 irrational.	 	 This	 is	 the	 requiring	 or	ought-making	feature	of	reasons,	as	here	reasons	require	(or	contribute	 to	 requiring)	 that	 we	 not	 perform	 a	 certain	action.	 	According	to	Gert	reasons	can	also	permit.	 	That	 is,	reasons	 can	 make	 (or	 count	 in	 favor	 of	 making)	 a	 certain	action	rational.		This	is	the	justifying	feature	of	reasons.		It	is	possible,	 according	 to	 Gert,	 for	 a	 reason	 to	 justify	 Ф–ing	without	requiring	it.		Gert	gives	the	example	of	self-defense:	it	 is	normally	 impermissible	 to	 intentionally	 cause	physical	harm	to	others;	however,	if	one	is	under	imminent	threat	of	physical	 harm	 one	 is	 permitted	 or	 is	 justified	 in	 defending	oneself	 by	 harming	 one’s	 attacker.	 	 The	 threat	 does	 not,	however,	count	in	favor	of	requiring	or	making	it	so	that	one	ought	or	must	harm	one’s	attacker.													The	 position	 that	 a	 reason	 can	 lack	 an	 ought-making	 or	requiring	 feature	 and	 still	 count	 as	 a	 reason	 is	controversial, 13 	yet	 even	 accepting	 some	 version	 of	 this	position,	 I	 am	 not	 sure	 whether	 the	 alteration	model	 fully	captures	 the	 phenomena	 of	 TAK	 practices.	 	 That	 said,	 the	alteration	model	does	much	better	than	the	previous	two.			As	 demonstrated	 above,	 when	 we	 choose	 to	 forgo	 the	prerogative	 to	 deflect	 a	 directive	 issued	 under	 the	aforementioned	conditions,	often	our	reason	for	doing	so	is	the	 directive	 itself.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 reason	 to	 grant	 the	request	 of	 a	 nosey	 friend	 is	 that	 she	made	 the	 request.	 	 In	
some	 such	 cases,	 when	 we	 choose	 to	 waive	 the	 issue	 of																																																														
13	See,	e.g.,	Broome	(2004).		
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standing,	 the	 way	 we	 engage	 with	 the	 directive	 is	 as	 if	 it	obligates	 us,	 as	 opposed	 to	merely	making	 complying	with	the	directive	rational	or	counting	 in	 favor	of	complying.	 	 In	other	words,	we	comply	with	such	directives	out	of	a	sense	of	
obligation	and	because	we	think	–	often	reluctantly	–	that	we	should,	 ought	or	must	do	 so,	not	 because	we	are	 somehow	
‘enticed’	by	 the	directive	 to	choose	 to	comply.	 	Accordingly,	in	such	cases	the	deflectable	directives	seem	to	do	more	than	make	compliance	rational	or	even	attractive;	they	also	make	it	required.		For	example,	generally	children	ought	 to	respect	or	at	 least	consider	their	parents’	requests	regarding	the	child’s	safety	and	 health,	 even	 if	 the	 requests	 are	 hypocritical.	 	 In	 the	example	of	 the	smoking	daughter	 I	am	 tempted	 to	 respond	to	 the	 defiant	 daughter	 whose	 parents’	 hypocrisy	 enables	her	 to	 ignore	 them	by	saying:	 “I	know	that	you	may	 ignore	them,	 but	 you	 mustn’t.”	 	 Thus,	 while	 recognizing	 the	daughter’s	 prerogative	 to	 disregard	 her	 parents’	 plea	 we	also	believe	that	she	ought	not	exercise	that	prerogative	and	that	doing	so	exposes	her	to	legitimate	criticism.		Accordingly,	 standing	 practices	 such	 as	 TAK	 –	 at	 their	extremes	 –	 entail	 curious	 cases.	 	 Cases	 in	 which	 it	 is	somehow	appropriate	to	 ignore	and	not	do	what	one	ought	
not	 to	 ignore	 and	 should	 do.	 	 In	 fact,	 such	 cases	 are	 the	cutting	 edge	 of	TAK	 practices	 and	 of	 standing	 norms	more	generally,	 providing	 for	 certain	 protective	 realms	 of	 choice	even	in	the	face	of	morality	and	reason.			The	 alteration	 model	 cannot	 account	 for	 these	 sorts	 of	peculiar	cases	featuring	in	practices	of	TAK.		Now	some	may	understandingly	 find	 it	 tempting	 to	 view	 this	 ‘bug’	 in	 the	model	 as	 a	 ‘feature’,	 as	 it	 identifies	 the	 limitation	 in	 the	practice	 rather	 than	 in	 the	model,	 concluding	 that	 at	 their	extreme	 standing	 practices	 are	 irrational	 because	 they	assume	 liberty	 to	 do	 what	 one	 ought	 not	 to	 do	 –	 an	irrationality	 that	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 alteration	 model.	 	 Yet	adopting	 this	 stance	 commits	 one	 to	 a	 highly	 revisionist	view,	 depicting	 numerous	 everyday	 practices	 as	 irrational.		Happily	there	is	an	alternative	model	that	casts	the	full	scope	of	 TAK	 practices	 in	 a	 rational	 light,	 thereby	 saving	 the	phenomena	 without	 slipping	 into	 contradiction	 and	irrationality.				
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3.4	Model	IV:	Exclusion	How	 then	 to	 explain	 the	 normative	 structure	 of	 ‘the	appropriate	deflection	of	directives’	under	conditions	of	TAK?		Thus	 far	 we	 have	 evaluated	 three	 possible	 models:	circumstances	 such	 as	 TAK	 (i)	 invalidate	 directives,	 (ii)	
change	the	reasons	constituted	by	directives	or	(iii)	give	rise	to	 reasons	 to	 reject	 the	 directives	which	 compete	 with	 the	directive-reasons.	 	 All	 three	 accounts	 fell	 short	 of	 fully	capturing	 the	phenomena.	 	 I	now	turn	 to	a	 fourth	and	 final	model,	 explaining	 the	nature	of	 the	 ‘appropriate	deflection’	in	terms	of	‘exclusionary	permission’.		To	understand	what	is	an	exclusionary	permission	it	is	best	to	first	understand	what	an	‘exclusionary	norm’	is,	which	is	a	second-order	 norm	 that	 gives	 second-order	 reasons	 not	 to	be	guided	by	(i.e.,	to	exclude	from	deliberation)	certain	first-order	 reasons.14		 First-order	 norms	 give	 reasons	 to	 do	 (or	deliberate,	 or	 believe	 or	 feel);	 second-order	 norms	 give	second-order	 reasons,	 that	 is	 reasons	 that	 relate	to	reasons	(not	to	actions,	beliefs	or	feelings)	(Raz	1990,	pp.	39-40).	Here	 is	 an	 illustrative	 example	 of	 an	 exclusionary	 second-order	 reason	 and	 how	 it	 relates	 to	 first-order	 reasons.	 	 I	promised	my	friend	to	join	him	at	the	pub	this	evening	only	to	later	receive	a	last-minute	invitation	to	join	another	group	for	dinner.	 	My	promise	 to	my	 friend	 is	 a	 reason	 for	me	 to	exclude	the	later	invitation	from	my	deliberations	on	what	to	do	 this	 evening	 even	 if,	 on	 the	 balance	 of	 reason,	 things	would	be	better	were	 I	 to	 disappoint	my	 friend	 in	 favor	 of	the	dinner.		My	promise	to	go	to	the	pub	does	not,	therefore,	defeat	or	outweigh	the	reasons	to	go	to	the	dinner.		In	fact,	it	is	stipulated	that	I	have	more	reason	to	go	to	the	dinner	than	to	 the	 pub.	 	 Rather,	 my	 promise	 functions	 here	 first	 as	 a	reason	 to	 go	 to	 the	 pub	 and	 second	 as	 an	 exclusionary	reason	 to	 exclude	 and	 not	 to	 incorporate	 into	my	practical	deliberation	those	conflicting	–	even	if	weightier	–	reasons	to	go	to	the	dinner.		In	addition	to	promises	(Raz	1977,	pp.	210-228),	Joseph	Raz	also	explains	the	structure	of	authoritative	reasons	in	terms	of	exclusionary	reasons	(Raz	1979,	pp.	37-52).		
																																																													
14	On	 ‘exclusionary	 reasons’	 and	 ‘exclusionary	 norms’	 see	 Raz	(1990,	pp.	40-48	and	pp.	73-76	respectively).		
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Like	 exclusionary	 norms,	 exclusionary	 permissions	 are	second-order	norms.	 	That	 is,	 they	do	not	give	reasons	that	compete	with	first-order	reasons,	such	as	reasons	for	actions	or	reasons	to	deliberate,	but	rather	regulate	the	exclusion	of	some	 such	 (first-order)	 reasons	 from	 one’s	 practical	deliberations	 regardless	 of	 the	 normative	 force	 of	 those	reasons.	 	But	unlike	exclusionary	norms,	which	require	one	not	 to	 be	 guided	 by	 excluded	 reasons,	 exclusionary	permissions	 merely	 permit	 it	 (Raz	 1990,	 p.	 90).	 Raz,	 for	example,	explains	supererogation	as	a	 form	of	exclusionary	permission	(Raz	1990,	pp.	91-97).	The	 form	 of	 exclusionary	 permission	 best	 captures	 the	structure	 of	 the	 appropriate	 deflection	 found	 in	 cases	 of	standing,	 such	 as	 practices	 of	 TAK.	 	 What	 explains	 the	appropriateness	of	 the	deflection	of	directives	 is	 that	given	the	 conditions	 of	 hypocrisy,	 or	meddling,	 or	 lack	 of	 status,	the	subjects	of	such	directives	are	permitted	to	exclude	those	directives	 from	 their	 practical	 deliberations,	 regardless	 of	their	weight	or	validity.			The	appeal	of	this	explanation	of	the	structure	of	standing	is	twofold.	 	 First,	 unlike	 the	 competition	model,	 the	 exclusion	model	 accommodates	 the	 fact	 that	 practices	 of	 TAK	 make	deflecting	 both	 appropriate	 and	 optional.	 	 Exclusionary	reasons	 do	 not	 involve	 the	 exclusion	 of	 reasons	 based	 on	their	 weight	 but	 rather	 on	 their	 type.	 	 Second,	 unlike	 the	invalidation	and	alteration	models,	the	exclusion	model	does	not	 condition	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 deflection	 on	 the	invalidity	of	 the	deflected	directive	or	on	 some	deflation	of	the	 reasons	 generated	by	 the	deflected	directive.	 	Which	 is	why	 the	 exclusion	model	 can	accommodate	what	 the	other	two	models	cannot:	that	practices	of	TAK	make	appropriate	deflecting	 (valid)	 directive-reasons,	 including	 even	 fully	robust	 directive-reasons	 –	 that	 is	 ‘ought-making	 reasons’	and	not	merely	‘good/rational-making	reasons.’	Moreover,	conceptualizing	TAK	practices	in	terms	of	second-order	norms	of	permissive	exclusion	casts	these	practices	in	a	 rational	 light,	making	 sense	 of	 and	 explaining	 in	 rational	terms	what	 are	 at	 times	 seemingly	 contradictory	 practices.		According	 to	 the	 exclusion	 model	 TAK	 practices	 do	 not	permit	doing	what	on	the	balance	of	reasons	one	should	not	do,	 which	 is	 irrational,	 but	 rather	 permit	 excluding	 (as	second-order	 norms)	 from	 one’s	 deliberations	 –	 that	 is	without	conflict	or	contradiction	–	reasons	that	contribute	to	
		 31	
determining	 (as	 first-order	 norms)	 what	 one	 should	 or	should	 not	 do.	 	 Similarly	 for	 example	 to	 how	promising	 or	commanding	 require	 excluding	 certain	 reasons,	 even	 if	weightier.		To	 conclude,	 practices	 of	 TAK	 share	 the	 structure	 of	 a	permission	 to	 exclude	 even	 valid	 directives.	 	 The	 facts	 on	which	 this	 shared	 structure	 of	 permission	 supervenes	obviously	differ	wildly	within	TAK	practices.		Very	generally,	as	 we	 have	 seen,	 these	 facts	 include	 types	 of	 hypocrisy	 in	cases	of	tu	quoque,	various	instances	of	meddling	in	cases	of	
age	tuum	negotium	 and	 lack	of	 status	 in	cases	of	 ‘know	thy	place’.	 	 My	 focus	 here	 has	 been	 on	 explaining	 what	 these	very	different	sets	of	practices	have	in	common	as	practices	of	standing:	they	all	provide	permission	to	exclude	directives	that	 were	 issued	 under	 certain	 compromising	 ad	hominem	circumstances.					
4.	Justification	and	Conclusion		My	 goal	 here	 was	 descriptive	 –	 to	 clarify	 the	 normative	structure	of	practices	of	TAK	and	of	the	concept	of	‘standing’	more	broadly.		Given	that	the	practices	exhibit	the	structure	of	 exclusionary	 permission,	 the	 question	 now	 becomes	whether	or	not	such	practices	are	justified.	 	Demonstrating	that	 they	 are	 is	 a	 tall	 order.	 	 How	 does	 morality	 or	rationality	 giveth	 with	 one	 hand	 (capacity	 to	 give	 valid	directives)	 what	 it	 taketh	 with	 the	 other	 (permission	 to	exclude	valid	directives)?	How	are	noncompliance	and	 the	ignoring	of	 relevant	 reasons	 ever	 justified,	 certainly	 in	 the	more	 extreme	 cases	 of	 excluding	 obligating	 reasons?	 	 In	other	words,	are	 ‘exclusionary	permissions’	more	than	just	misguided	social	norms?		Do	they	make	moral	sense?		Or	do	they	 just	risk	resulting	 in	people	regularly	 failing	 to	act	on	the	 balance	 of	 reasons?	 	 These	 questions	 regarding	justification	 are	 important	 especially	 given	 the	pervasiveness	 of	 TAK	 practices.	 	 Were	 such	 practices	ungrounded	 the	 implications	 for	 many	 of	 our	 everyday	practices	 and	 moral	 intuitions	 would	 be	 dramatically	revisionary.	The	grounds	of	 standing	practices	begin,	 to	my	mind,	with	the	 values	 that	 such	 practices	 serve	 to	 protect	 through	imposing	 duties	 of	 nonintervention.	 	 Now	 these	 values	obviously	vary	with	context	and	the	specific	standing	norm	–	 tu	 quoque,	 age	 tuum	negotium,	 or	 ‘know	 thy	 place’.	 	 Yet	
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they	 plausibly	 include	 values	 that	 are	 sensitive	 to	intervention	and	 intrusion,	 such	as	 autonomy,	privacy	and	valuable	relations.		Such	values	are	to	an	extent	content-free	–	identifying	realms	of	noninterference	even	at	the	price	of	a	 measure	 of	 irrationality	 or	 normative	 error.	 	Obviously	developing	an	account	of	the	grounds	of	TAK	practices	along	these	 lines	must	 await	 another	 occasion.	 	 Yet	 the	 point	 is	that	understanding	the	structure	of	the	practice	of	standing	makes	salient	the	significance	of	accounting	for	its	grounds.		Finally,	recognizing	that	the	normative	structure	of	standing	practices	does	not	turn	on	invalidating	directives	but	rather	on	 their	 permissible	 exclusion,	 demonstrates	 something	rather	 surprising:	 that	 norms	 of	 standing	 are	 not	 a	 sub-category	 of	 norms	 of	 normative	 power,	 such	 as	 authority.		Standing	norms	are	not,	 in	other	words,	norms	of	validity.		Accordingly,	 ‘power	 or	 authority	 to	 direct’	 does	 not	necessarily	 entail	 ‘standing	 to	 direct’,	 which	 establishes	standing	as	a	distinct	and	 independent	normative	category	as	 well	 as	 opens	 up	 a	 conceptual	 space	 of	 surprising	implications.		For	instance,	legitimate	authority	to	command	others,	 such	 as	 the	 authority	 held	 by	 legitimate	 state	sovereigns,	 does	 not	 guarantee	 standing	 to	 so	 command	and,	 therefore,	 opens	 the	 door	 for	 cases	 in	which	we	may	permissibly	 disregard	 –	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 no	 standing	 –	legitimate	law.	
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